Which countries have diplomatic relations with North Korea?

Part
01
of two
Part
01

Which countries have diplomatic relations with North Korea?

Key Takeaways

  • There are 24 countries that have embassies in North Korea. In 2021, the majority of these embassies went vacant with foreign diplomats leaving the country and closed borders due to COVID-19. Nations with embassies in the DPRK include Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Nigeria.
  • Worldwide, 46 countries host North Korean embassies. Countries included in this grouping are Mexico, Senegal, Iran, India, and Mongolia. Additionally, North Korea has consulates in China, Russia, Pakistan, and Hong Kong. The country also has a trade office in Zimbabwe and a representative office in Belarus.
  • The Soviet Union was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948. In 2014, Russia wrote off 90% of North Korea's unpaid $11 billion Cold War debt.

Introduction

This research provides an overview of the international relationships that North Korea maintains diplomatically. Consideration is given to the number of countries North Korea has established diplomatic relationships with along with which countries host North Korean embassies or have embassies established on North Korean soil. It also gives a high-level overview of North Korea's relationship with Russia and China, both of which North Korea has been historically close to.

Overview of North Korea's International Relations

  • There are 24 countries that have embassies in North Korea. In 2021, the majority of these embassies went vacant with foreign diplomats leaving the country and closed borders due to COVID-19. Nations with embassies in the DPRK include Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Nigeria.
  • Worldwide, 46 countries host North Korean embassies. Countries included in this grouping are Mexico, Senegal, Iran, India, and Mongolia. Additionally, North Korea has consulates in China, Russia, Pakistan, and Hong Kong. The country also has a trade office in Zimbabwe and a representative office in Belarus.

Overview of Relationship with Russia

Overview of Relationship with China

  • The first trip outside of the country for leader Kim Jung Un was a rail journey to China in 2018. Several additional visits by Mr. Kim to China have since ensued. It was stated about these visits: "[Mr] Kim is eager to remind the Trump administration that he does have diplomatic and economic options besides what Washington and Seoul can offer."
  • With the United States providing increased support to Japan and South Korea, China and North Korea have strengthened diplomacy between themselves. A professor of Korean Studies said about the situation: "The major game changer is the confrontation with the United States. It means that the strategic value of North Korea from the Chinese point of view has increased dramatically. For North Korea, the Sino-U.S. rivalry is a kind of gift sent by the heavens. It gives them essentially unconditional Chinese support — something in the past they couldn’t even dream about."

Research Strategy

For this research on North Korea's international relations, we leveraged the most reputable sources of information that were available in the public domain, including news resources such as the Washington Post, NPR, and the BBC along with political commentary and reporting sources like The Diplomat. The resource "North Korea in the World" proved to be a great wealth of information providing economic and historical information about North Korea. Additionally, this site included the most up-to-date information about diplomatic relations and the organizations that the country is involved with. To obtain the total number of international organizations that North Korea is currently involved in, we counted each type of organization on the North Korea External Relations source and then added the three numbers together: 22 + 30 + 9 = 61.
Part
02
of two
Part
02

Is South Korea interested in uniting the Korean Peninsula?

Key Takeaways

  • "In the online survey of 72,524 elementary, middle, and high school students conducted by the education ministry and the unification ministry between November and December 2021, 61.2% of the respondents revealed that unification was necessary," as reported by Korea Herald. The most cited reasons for unification among this group of respondents are the reduction of the threat of war (27.2%), the same ethnic race (25.5%), and the resolution of the separated family problem (20.9%).
  • Reports show that the chances of resuming or continuing talks with North Korea, as desired and designed by Moon's administration, were apparently diminished upon Yoon's election as the president. President Yoon is a known proponent of a hardline stance on North Korea and nurses a more hawkish approach, such as wanting preconditions to any dialogue.
  • North Korea's nuclear capabilities and threats are said to have contributed to this development; thus, "President Yoon’s policy on North Korea will likely be dependent on North Korea’s military actions and the public's general perception."
  • In 2021, a survey conducted in South Korea revealed that the majority of South Koreans (about 60.6%) said only selected North Korean defectors should be accepted into South Korea by the South Korean government. "Only about 24.7% said that all North Korean defectors should be accepted.

Introduction

While surveys and polls suggest that the majority of South Koreans favor unification with North Korea and welcoming North Korean defectors, the trend is gradually declining as more South Koreans are increasingly becoming opposed to unification attempts. This research provides an analysis of South Korea's sentiment about North Korea, including data on the public support for or against unification and defectors, as well the stance of the government on the Northern side of the Korean peninsula. Below is an overview of our findings.

Analysis of South Korea's Sentiment About North Korea

Public Support/Opposition for Unification

  • "In the online survey of 72,524 elementary, middle, and high school students conducted by the education ministry and the unification ministry between November and December 2021, 61.2% of the respondents revealed that unification was necessary," as reported by Korea Herald.
  • The most cited reasons for unification among this group are the reduction of the threat of war (27.2%), the same ethnic race (25.5%), and the resolution of the separated family problem (20.9%).
  • Of the survey respondents, one out of four, or 25% said unification was not needed, with the share of those against unification increasing for the third consecutive year from 19.4% in 2019 and 24.2% in 2020.
  • The most cited reasons for those against unification are the economic burden (29.8%), potential social problems after unification (25%), and political differences between the South and the North (17%).
  • Another survey conducted by the Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification Studies between July and August 2021, on 1,200 South Koreans between the ages of 20 and 74, revealed similar sentiments and trends among South Koreans. It showed that about 44% of respondents said reunification was somewhat necessary. "The figure represents the lowest number of people who believe reunification is necessary since the poll’s inception in 2007."
  • Contrastingly, the number of those against reunification has steadily increased from 16% to 29% year-over-year. This cohort further highlighted economic burdens as the most cited reason (32%) against reunification, as "Seoul is expected to absorb much of the costs associated with reunification."

The Stance of the Government and Political Parties on North Korea

  • The South Korean constitution is known to aim toward achieving reunification with North Korea peacefully and in that light, several progressive South Korean presidents made concerted efforts toward reunification.
  • According to The Diplomat, "Former President Kim Dae-jung became the first Korean Nobel Peace Prize laureate for his contribution toward easing hostilities in the Korean peninsula by staging the first inter-Korean summit in 2000."
  • Kim Dae-jung's successor, Roh Moo-hyun, continued this path by advancing the Sunshine Policy, which aimed at reducing tensions in the peninsula through interaction and humanitarian and economic assistance. Even in the face of provocation, two conservative successors, including Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak, remained tolerant to keep economic and national ties alive.
  • "Following a decade of conservative rule, Former President Moon Jae-in from the ruling Democratic Party made history by organizing three inter-Korean summits in 2018." Furthermore, in 2021, he repeatedly echoed the need for ending the conflict that divides the two nations — "a call to which senior North Korean official Kim Yo Jong, the sister of leader Kim Jong Un, responded as a 'good idea.'"
  • "In May 2021, South Korea’s infrastructure ministry invited bids for possible infrastructure projects in the North, including those concerning the mining sector. It reportedly sees such resources as potentially covering the cost of repairing the North’s decrepit infrastructure, should reunification occur," as per National Interest.
  • Contrastingly, the chairman of the leading opposition People Power Party (PPP), Lee Jun-seok, opposed any chance of reunification and instead, suggested an outright takeover of the North.
  • In January 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol, the then-presidential candidate from the PPP and South Korea's new President, before he took office, labeled North Korea as 'the nemesis' and even went ahead to propose preemptive strikes.
  • With this, reports show that the chances of resuming or continuing talks with North Korea, as desired and designed by Moon's administration, were apparently diminished upon Yoon's election as the president. President Yoon is a known proponent of a hardline stance on North Korea and nurses a more hawkish approach, such as wanting preconditions to any dialogue.
  • North Korea's nuclear capabilities and threats are said to have contributed to this development; thus, "President Yoon’s policy on North Korea will likely be dependent on North Korea’s military actions and the public's perception."

South Koreans’ Sentiment About Defectors From North Korea

  • In 2021, a survey conducted in South Korea revealed that the majority of South Koreans (about 60.6%) said only selected North Korean defectors should be accepted into South Korea by the South Korean government. "Only about 24.7% said that all North Korean defectors should be accepted. Below is a chart of the survey results from 2007 to 2021."
  • The trend, as shown above, shows that more South Koreans are becoming increasingly reluctant to accept North Korean defectors, as the share of the Southerners who either do not want to accept any Northern defectors or would prefer only select defectors has generally increased from 2007 to 2021, while those who prefer to accept every defector have declined in the same period.
  • The latest survey conducted by the Korea Institute for National Unification on 8,000 South Koreans last fall revealed that the negative sentiment South Koreans hold about North Korean defectors has doubled since 2016, from 12.1% to 25.1%.
  • To corroborate this sentiment, "the KIPA survey also found 13% of South Koreans — more than double the rate recorded in 2017, said they cannot accept foreign immigrants and laborers." This sentiment among South Koreans about North Korean defectors is often baseless, according to Lee Sang-shin, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.

Research Strategy

For this research, we have leveraged credible sources that are publicly available, including the Diplomat, Statista, Korea Herald, and the Lowy Institute, among others. In some instances, slightly dated resources were used to add robustness and/or corroboration to the findings, considering the highly specific nature of the topic and the limited availability of more recent reputable sources.

Did this report spark your curiosity?

Sources
Sources

From Part 01
From Part 02